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Abstract 
This work presents a history of the co-operative firm in China from its origins 
in the early 20th century. The aim is to describe how in its evolution, the Chinese co-
operative movement has diverged from the western notion of a co-operative. To 
understand the similarities and the divergence, we will consider a number of 
economic and cultural factors, including the etymology of the Chinese and English 
words for ‘co-operative’, the Confucian culture, and the influence of the political 
contingencies. We argue that contemporary Chinese economic transition would 
benefit from the presence of a strong, western style, co-operative sector but that the 
contribution of the co-operative sector towards sustainability cannot take place unless 
a civil society develops as well. 
 
Keywords: China, Civil Society, Co-operative, Confucianism, Human Development, 
Sustainability. 
 
  
2 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The co-operative firm is an institution with a very long history. The roots of 
modern co-operation can be traced back to a variety of forms of collective or 
communitarian work, such as those that existed within the Roman Empire, ancient 
Egypt, ancient Asian societies, or the Latin American pre-Columbian peoples 
(Douglas, 1986). 
In 1844, the first modern co-operative organized around a formal business 
model was established in Rochdale, near Manchester, UK. At the end of the industrial 
revolution, and as a response to its side effects and social problems, western societies 
developed the co-operative model; co-operatives emerged from the same context that 
generated the workers’ and democratic movements of the 1800s, trade unions, the 
Communist Manifesto, and later the Rerum Novarum encyclical. In the following 150 
years, the modern co-operative became a worldwide model of economic organization 
in production, retail, manufacturing, services, and banking sectors (Birchall, 1997). 
The origin and the role of Co-operation in Asia, and particularly in China and 
other countries with a Confucian culture, have received relatively little attention in 
scholarly research. It is particularly important to study the role of the co-operative 
firm in countries with a culture characterized by a high propensity for collectivism 
and community values  (Hofstede, 2001; Lockett, 1988 Tung, 1988; Hofstede and dan 
Bond, 1988; Littrell, 2002). It might be expected that countries which embrace such 
collective values would provide fertile ground for co-operation to take root and grow. 
In reality the situation is much more complicated, not only because the propensity for 
collectivism coexists with other conflicting values (Laaksonen, 1984), but above all 
because these values have to engage with the economic and political regimes that 
have developed in these countries. Despite their success and diffusion, to measure 
national cultures remains a controversial methodological challenge (McSweeney, 
2002; Williamson, 2002). 
Studying co-operation in Asian countries such as China (Taimni, 1994), but 
also Vietnam (Kornai and Yingyi, 2009) and Cambodia, it is vital to address how this 
form of enterprise has evolved in a period of transition (Hongyi, 2000) from centrally 
planned economies which are under the strict control of the State to economies open 
to the dynamics of the free market (Smith, 1994). 
The modern form of co-operative arrived in China at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. This work argues that the model has proved to fit with Chinese 
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institutions and local historical contingencies and that it might prove especially useful 
to the transformations that contemporary China is undergoing, particularly in dealing 
with social and economic inequalities and sustainable development. The Chinese 
Government and Legislature have recently (in the 12th Five Years Plan and in the 2013 
meetings of the National People’s Congress) defined such challenges and, in some 
cases, have explicitly mentioned the co-operative firm as a tool that might help to 
address them. 
This work has as its foundations in a literature review of international 
literature on the co-operative movement. But the authors’ experiences of teaching and 
doing research in academic institutions in Asia (China and Vietnam) also played a role 
in its genesis. In particular, one author was able to visit a number of co-operatives and 
to engage with co-operative leaders in the following areas: Beijing, Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Zhejiang, Guangxi. The research questions that triggered this investigation are: 
1) Does the western notion of the co-operative fit the Chinese case? 
2) Has Maoism contributed to the flourishing of the Co-operative Movement? 
3) How has the co-operative model evolved alongside political and institutional 
transition? 
4) Can the Co-operative movement contribute to contemporary China’s 
development and sustainability challenges? 
We have not followed the traditional order (literature review - data analysis). This 
is because the four research questions investigate very different issues and hence will 
be addressed with varied methods of analysis. Following the literature review and the 
analysis, an individual section is devoted to each research question. The first analysis 
is etymological. The second and third questions are answered through theoretical and 
historical analysis. The fourth question is addressed through a theoretical analysis and 
by adopting the Human Development Index. 
In Section 2, Co-operatives and China, we will answer the first research 
question after the etymological analysis of the Chinese word “co-operative”, the 
analysis of western and Chinese notions of co-operation and its history. In Section 3, 
Co-operatives and Mao, we will answer the second research question with a literature 
review and an historical analysis that will highlight how Maoism has dramatically 
changed the evolutionary path of the Chinese Co-operative Movement. In section 4, A 
Long Institutional Transition, we will answer the third research question by providing 
a historical account of the main forms of collective and co-operative organisations in 
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the People’s Republic of China. In Section 5, after identifying the Challenges of 
contemporary China, we will answer the fourth research question with a policy 
approach. Section 6 will present the implications for theory, practice and policy. Brief 
conclusions will follow. 
  
5 
 
2 CO-OPERATIVES AND CHINA 
Enquiry into Chinese co-operatives begins with a linguistic and 
epistemological difficulty: do we mean the same thing in China and in the West when 
we talk about a Co-operative? To answer this, we will turn to the etymology of key 
terms, to the values promulgated by the International Co-operative Movement, and to 
the dominant Chinese cultural values. 
 
Etymology 
To start with etymology, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the use 
of the adjective ‘co-operative’ dates back to at least 1603, when it meant ‘willingness 
or ability’ to work with others. As a substantive, it was already established enough in 
the late 1820s for William King to publish a series of papers entitled ‘The Co-
operator’. The word ‘co-operation’ in English means ‘working together’, using the 
prefix ‘co-’ from the Latin ‘cum’ (‘be with’). The Chinese definition is more 
complex. It brings in a number of related concepts that in English have found 
expression through other formulations, such as ‘mutual aid’, ‘mutual help’, and so on. 
The Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition of the co-operative firm:  
“The combination of a number of persons, or of a 
community, for purposes of economic production or distribution, so 
as to save, for the benefit of the whole body of producers or 
customers, that which otherwise becomes the profit of the individual 
capitalist. As originally used by Owen the name contemplated the 
co-operation of the whole community for all economic purposes, i.e. 
communism. In practice, the principle has been carried out in 
production, when a body of workmen corporately own the capital by 
which their concern is carried on, and thus unite within themselves 
the interests of capital and labour, of employer and employed; and 
in distribution, when an association of purchasers contribute the 
capital of a store by which they are supplied with goods, and thus 
combine in themselves the interests of trader and customers.” 
In Mandarin Chinese, the characters used for co-operative are !"#; the 
Pinyin transliteration is He Zuo She.  
He (!): a pictographic character. The character is reminiscent of a container, 
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the lower rectangle ($), with a lid, the upper triangle (%). This originally meant 
‘close or shut the lid’. Subsequently, it has come to mean assemble, unite, ally, 
combine, and even to merge, amalgamate, marry, and make friends (Zuo, 2006, Xie 
2000).  
Zuo ("): an ideographic character. In ancient bronze-age inscriptions the 
lower part resembled a knife and the top represented divination. The overall image is 
that of an oracle engaged in divination through the use of the knife on plants or 
animals. The range of meanings of the character has included making, embarking on, 
cutting, setting up. Later the meaning of the character was extended to doing, arising, 
building, performing, playing, and reaching (Gu, 2008).  
She (#): an ideographic and pictographic character. In the ancient scriptures 
of the Bronze Age it represented veneration of the god of the earth. The character is 
composed of two parts: on the right, a stone altar, a place for offerings and sacrifices, 
and on the left worship combined with the character for wood. In ancient times, these 
traits take on the complex meaning of a place of sacrifice to the god of the earth, 
municipality, and agency (Gu, 2008). Today the immediate meaning is work unit or 
social structure. The place of worship of deities or ancestors in Chinese villages was 
located at the centre of the family home or the village itself. For this reason, the image 
of the place of worship takes us to the idea of social structure.  
While He stands for an attitude (coherence, no conflict, harmony), Zuo stands 
for a form of behaviour (to act, to do, to start), and, finally, She stands for a place 
where the action takes place (the team, the group, the community, the small firm). 
Thus, the etymology of the Chinese word for co-operation invokes images of union, 
mutual help, realization, society, and community. Such images are fully compatible 
with the western conception of the idea of co-operation (Cheng-Chung 1988). In this 
model of a firm, it is the workers and members of the co-operative who own it. As 
such, this type of firm tends to take an especial interest in sustainable and responsible 
development. 
 
International values 
The leading co-operative organisation, the International Co-operative Alliance 
(ICA), has helped to define a set of common values among the national co-operative 
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movements. In defining a co-operative firm, the ICA in 1995 drafted a statement of 
co-operative identity: ‘A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.’ This definition is 
especially useful in understanding the co-operative phenomenon because it is the 
result of the combined work of delegates of national co-operative associations from 
all over the world.  
In defining the essence of a co-operative firm, one might be tempted to adopt a 
legal definition. While co-operative enterprises exist in most jurisdictions around the 
world, each country provides a different, sometimes deeply different, legal definition 
of a co-operative enterprise. Clearly, it is not the legal form to differentiate co-
operative firms from other forms of enterprise. The ICA definition helps us overcome 
this challenge of identifying similarities across a number of different manifestations 
of the phenomenon.  
 To qualify as a co-operative, the definition suggests that the following criteria 
need to be met: 
a) Autonomy from other organizations: A co-operative cannot be owned by another 
enterprise, but it can control other entities for instrumental purposes; 
b) Persons united voluntarily: again, if people are forced to join, the organization 
ceases to be a genuine co-operative. This element does not rule out co-operative 
consortia, but only if they are built ultimately to serve the individual; 
c) Economic, social, and cultural needs. This element of the definition is crucial to 
expanding the notion of the co-operative firm beyond the realm of mere economic 
exchange and hence taking into account organizations focused on solving social 
problems or promoting cultural production and consumption; 
d) Jointly-owned.  Members must also be shareholders of the organization; 
e) Democratically-controlled. There must be a competitive governance system, in 
which people can contribute effectively to steering the organization; 
In its 1995 statement, the ICA moves beyond a simple working definition to 
spell out seven universal values to be embraced by co-operative enterprises (they have 
subsequently become part of co-operative founding charters in several countries). 
Some of these values are a direct consequence of the principles embedded in the 
definition we are using: Voluntary and Open Membership, Democratic Member 
Control, Autonomy and Independence, Member Economic Participation. However, 
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three further value statements are worthy of note, adding some flavour to the overall 
definition of a co-operative enterprise: Education, Training and Information, Co-
operation among Co-operatives, and Concern for Community.  
The idea of education, training, and information as a founding value can be 
linked to the idea of democratic control: it is hard to imagine members being an 
effective part of the organizational governance if they are not properly informed of 
and trained in their role.  
The last principle is of great interest in order to fully comprehend the nature of 
a co-operative firm: that a co-operative is concerned for community is not a truism, as 
it might appear at first sight. Rather, it means that it should go beyond its members’ 
interests to embrace the interest of the wider community. In other words, according to 
this principle, co-operatives should be socially responsible entities taking into account 
all of their stakeholders’ interests (Bernardi, 2007; MacPherson, 2008).  
The principle of co-operation among co-operatives can be seen as the 
founding principle of the co-operative movement in its contemporary sense (Birchall, 
1997). The principle is well illustrated by the existence of a myriad of co-operative 
business associations and consortia representing the interests of co-operatives at the 
local and national level. At the international level, the ICA is technically an 
association of associations and this principle is connected to the notion of an 
international co-operative movement (Birchall, 1997). Through the ICA and national 
associations, co-operative enterprises can be seen as ‘activists’, promoting co-
operative firms as a potential solution for a number of economic and social issues 
(Nilsson, 1996). A number of individuals in the early 19th century played a role in the 
birth of the co-operative movement, most significantly, Robert Owen and William 
King, but the history of the co-operative movement dates back to 1844, with the 
institution of the first successful co-operative: The Rochdale Society of Equitable 
Pioneers. By no accident, their rulebook shares a great deal in common with the 
ICA’s current definition.  
Applying these definitions to the Chinese context may be challenging because 
some of the components of the definition could be called in question when it comes to 
the development of co-operative institutions in the history of the People’s Republic of 
China. Chinese co-operatives meet the basic conditions, however, the level of 
autonomy and democratic control exercised by members has varied across time. 
The voluntary and open membership principle is no longer violated by the 
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collectivist policies, although democratic control and independence principles are 
certainly lacking in most cases. As will be described in detail in section 4, the 2007 
law on Farmers Specialized Co-operatives is a telling example because it was 
purposefully introduced to improve the economic initiative and participation of 
members, but ended up giving too much power to higher-level co-operatives and 
organisations. As we will argue in section 5, intrusions from external actors and 
organisations to the detriment of true member participation are not only due to the 
pressures coming from national and local political authorities, but are also the result 
of the lack of a civil society able to sustain participation and control (Fulda et al., 
2012). The Chinese co-operative movement has not been fully integrated into broader 
civil society (Hall, 1995), unlike its counterparts in the western world. Democracy 
exists in China only at a very local level; where the citizenship is not used to 
democracy, it naturally follows that the growth of democratic participation of workers 
and members on the co-operative model is not likely to flourish. Not by chance, the 
co-operative movement in England took hold at the very same time as social battles 
for labour and political rights were being fought. Democratic and co-operative 
movements have longstanding ties in many nations. 
 
Confucianism 
A final argument about how well, or not, the co-operative movement fits with 
China’s social and institutional environment is the cultural one. The main cultural 
pillar of Chinese society is Confucianism (Weber, 1951), a complex philosophical 
system that extends beyond the original writings of Confucius (Hofstede and dan 
Bond, 1988; Wah, 2010). While it is beyond the scope of this work to attempt to 
provide a description of this complex system, there is no question that striving for 
harmony is one of the basic values of a society with a Confucian legacy (Bell and dan 
Chaibong, 2003). Social harmony is a value per se and everything that undermines 
social unity is considered evil (Hill, 2006). This principle notably carries two almost 
opposite implications for the understanding of co-operative firms within the context 
of Chinese culture. On the one hand, as Weber was already noting in her seminal 
1951 work on the sociology of religion in China, the value of social harmony tends to 
reaffirm the status quo and undermine performance and merit. This is potentially 
detrimental to the idea of independent and democratically controlled entrepreneurial 
activities. On the other hand, the principle of social harmony seems to be calling for 
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economic and social organizations that can promote the value of mutual help and 
working together, values that are inherent to an agricultural society, as China has been 
for millennia (Cheng-Chung, 1988).  
The need for social harmony and co-operation was formalized in the 2011-
2015 Five Years Plan by the former political leadership of China. The ex-President 
Hu Jintao and ex-Premier Wen Jiabao left incomplete the challenge of the 
Harmonious Society, héxié shèhuì (Wong and Ruobing, 2006). It is striking that one 
of the characters of ‘Harmonious Society’ in Chinese is the same as ‘Co-operative’ in 
Chinese. 
We are thus in a position to answer the first research question. The western 
notion of Co-operative and Co-operation fits well with China. The etymological 
analysis has revealed that the meaning historically embedded in the words ‘co-
operation’ and ‘co-operative’ in China and in the West is broadly the same. 
Furthermore, China is a full and active member of the international co-operative 
movement and has played a part in elaborating the co-operative values, most of which 
are compatible with the unique nature of the Chinese institutional system today. 
Finally, as a Confucian society, China might provide a good cultural environment that 
allows co-operative organizations and behaviour to develop, if supported by national 
and local policies.  
In the next section we will argue that despite the fact that all the conditions for 
the development of a true co-operative movement have been present since the 
beginning of the last century. The influence of Maoism meant that the developments 
made from 1912 fell into abeyance for a long period. As will be explained later, from 
the 1980s China has been back on track and moving towards the development and 
progression of a strong and genuine co-operative sector, as testified in the 
Government initiatives of 2002 (New Rural co-operative Scheme), 2007 (Farmers 
Specialized Co-operatives law), and 2009 (Farmers connected to supermarket 
projects). 
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3 CO-OPERATIVES AND MAO 
In answering the second research question, we turn to history, asking if 
Maoism contributed to the flourishing of the Co-operative Movement. 
It is possible to divide the modern history of the Chinese Co-operative 
Movement into three phases: the Republican period (1912 to 1948), the Maoist period 
(1949 to 1976), and the Contemporary China period (after Mao’s death in 1976). In 
this section, we argue that Maoism has represented a deviation from the western, or, 
indeed, international, notion of co-operation. The Republican period and the 
Contemporary China period see a gradual convergence with the international notion 
of the co-operative. The Maoist version of co-operation, even more than the Soviet 
one, has represented a discontinuity from the idea of co-operation as shared in the 
West and in contemporary China (MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1987, 1992). 
The history of Chinese co-operation, excluding the primordial forms of 
informal co-operation widely present in ancient civilizations worldwide (in China 
connected to the management of water for agricultural purposes), seems to date from 
the first decade of the twentieth century. For a long time the Empire of Japan 
controlled Manchuria (1931-1945) and the island of Taiwan (1895-1945), and during 
this period successfully introduced the co-operative model in agriculture. However, an 
autochthone Chinese co-operative movement emerged, at the time of the 
establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. In the early decades of the 20th 
century, some Chinese political and social reformers, such as Sun Yat-sen, the 
founding father of the Republic, introduced the co-operative model encountered 
abroad. This idea met with repression out of fear that co-operation came hand in hand 
with socialism. In 1921, the Chinese Communist Party was founded. 
Some co-operative milestones, in those politically dramatic years, are well 
documented, others less so. We know that the first co-operatives appeared in 1912 
and the first co-operative bank was founded in 1923 in Hebei Province. We also know 
that in 1937 there were over 12,000 co-operatives across 191 counties (Fairbank and 
Feuerwerker, 1986). The European co-operative ideals and practices, once they had 
arrived in China, were elaborated by local intellectuals; for instance, Xue Xian-Zhou, 
who theorized a utopian ‘Project of National Co-operativisation’ (Cheng Chung, 
1988). 
Between 1928 and 1949, following a financial crisis, the Nationalist 
Government of Chiang Kai Shek, decided to support the introduction of a system of 
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credit co-operatives along the German Raffaisen model. During the era of Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s Republic of China, Chinese organisations for the promotion of co-
operative firms were established with the financial and intellectual support of the 
west. This is the case with the intervention of the Rockefeller Program and of the 
missionary devotion of a Christian philanthropist and social reformer, John Bernard 
Tayler (Trescott, 1993). 
 
Gung Ho 
The oldest co-operative society was founded in wartime, with a set of values 
including mutual assistance and the defence of national identity. This organization, 
named the Gung Ho, or ICCIC (International Committee for the Promotion of 
Chinese Industrial Co-operatives), was founded in 1938 in Hong Kong thanks to the 
inspiration of the New Zealander Rewi Alley and some other foreigners (intellectuals, 
journalists, western diplomats, adventurers, bankers, Christian missionaries, British 
politicians) and western educated Chinese (engineers, intellectuals, and the wife of Dr 
Sun Yatsen). Their aim was to organize the unemployed and refugees to take part in 
productive activities in support of the war of resistance against the Japanese invaders. 
Gung Ho spread throughout the unoccupied Chinese territories from 1939 and 
reached its peak in 1941. Approximately 3,000 co-operatives were active, with 30,000 
members, and produced essential goods for the population, as well as supplying the 
front with blankets, uniforms, and other goods for the Chinese army (Cook and Clegg, 
2012). The Gung Ho became the place for the cultivation of ideas and the 
mobilization of patriotism and independence. Something very similar occurred in 
Finland. There, the Pellervo Society and its co-operatives, during the Russian rule of 
Finland, were the only associations not prohibited by law. The society was then a 
place for the elaboration of co-operative and patriotic ideals. 
The Statute of the ICCIC says that the spirit of Gung Ho is to ‘work hard and 
work together, helping one another to achieve common prosperity’. The 
organization’s principles are: 
‘voluntary organization, self-financing, self-government, 
independent accounting, taking responsibility for gains and losses, 
democratic management, with distribution to each in proportion to 
their work and dividends in proportion to shares’.  
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These resemble modern western principles of co-operation and recall many 
aspects of the ICA Manchester Statement in 1995 (Voluntary and open membership, 
Democratic member control, Member economic participation, Autonomy and 
independence, Education, training and information, Co-operation among c-operatives; 
Concern for community). Cheng-Chung (1988) explicitly addresses the compatibility 
of Chinese culture and co-operative principles in describing how western European 
theories came to China. 
The Gung Ho was supported by western individuals, organisations, and 
Government bodies because of its strategic role during the Japanese invasion and the 
Second World War (Barnett, 1940). The British Empire and the United States decided 
to fund and support the Gung Ho because they recognised in it a social democratic 
political and economic alternative to the increasingly powerful Chinese Communist 
Party (Wales, 2004; Barnett, 1940). The Gung Ho originally operated in the areas 
under the control of both the Communist and the Nationalist armies and was 
supported by both Mao and Chang Kai Scheck, though this support was accompanied 
by a certain suspicion and they both soon started to express misgivings about its 
foreign influenced nature (Cook and Clegg, 2012). 
When Mao gained full control in Mainland China, he managed to have the 
activities of ICCIC suspended. Mao’s ideology didn’t fit well with the Gung Ho 
which was an advocate of democracy, bottom-up participation and industrial rather 
than agricultural development (Fairbank, 1998; Vermeer et.al., 1998). 
Despite formal support by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Soong Ching Ling, Ye 
Ting, and other revolutionary leaders for its contribution to the cause of Chinese 
liberation, the ICCIC activities were suspended in 1949. Other associations of co-
operatives, more in line with party ideology and the institutional developments of 
China were established. Among those, for instance, the All China Federation of 
Handicraft and Industrial Co-operatives was established to serve the national planning 
started in 1950. 
 
Maoism 
A very different period begins when Mao enters the stage of Chinese history. 
Even before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao had 
recognised that it would be necessary to organize production, consumption, and credit 
along co-operative lines in order to develop a collectivized economy (Keating, 1997). 
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Maoism took shape during the Civil War and the 1933-1935 Long March and was put 
to the test, drawing from Marxism-Leninism and from the Soviet example, in the 
remote base of the Red Army in the middle of China, near the city of Yan’an, where 
Mao’s revolutionary army was headquartered. Mao quickly focused his strategy on 
agriculture rather than industry (Teiwes and Sun, 1993) or the intellectual class. 
Between 1943 and 1944 rural co-operativization was started in areas under the steady 
control of Mao’s army. In the case of Yan’an, the model seems to have worked and 
was soon idealized and used as an example to be replicated everywhere. Thus was 
born the myth of the ‘Yan’an Way’ (Keating, 1994; Stettner and Oram, 1987). It is 
not easy to say whether Mao’s co-operatives were co-operatives in all respects; if, for 
example, they respected the principle of voluntary membership. It might be that over 
the years the ideological aspect of sharing gave way to party bureaucracy and to 
disillusionment. It can also be supposed that the size of the villages, co-operatives, or 
land may have sometimes facilitated the participation of members and social control 
(Keating, 1997). 
Du (2002) provides estimates that show the number of Chinese co-operatives 
leaps from 722 in 1928 to almost 169,000 in 1948. With the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China Mao would progressively collectivize the organisation of 
economic production based on the Soviet model, but going further still (Teiwes and 
Sun, 1993). From 1952, rural co-operation started to develop across the Chinese 
mainland (Vermeer et al., 1998). In rural areas – a large part of Chinese territory even 
today, and especially at that time – three main types of co-operatives developed: 
production co-operatives, distribution and marketing co-operatives, and rural credit 
co-operatives (Cheng, 2006; Xie, 2003). 
The escalation of the collectivist ideology began in 1958, with the launch of 
the Great Leap Forward. In that long period, several forms of collective work were 
deployed in agriculture, industry, and services. The co-operative model was involved 
in that huge economic, political, and social experiment that peaked in the 1970s but 
which, as it turned out, proved dramatically ineffective and inefficient when it came 
to fulfilling Mao’s projected goals.  
An example of how the co-operative model was used by Mao, beside Soviet-
style collectivization, is the so-called Rural Co-operative Medical Scheme. This was 
the main provider of health care in rural China until the late 1970s (Bernardi and 
Greenwood, 2011). It was a vast undertaking but by no means equated to the western 
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system of mutual health because of the ideological use that the national and local 
authorities made of it. Similarly, most of the other forms of collective economic 
production, dealt with in the next section, were not a business initiative with bottom-
up participation and control.  
The concept of People’s Communes originated in 1958. By the end of that 
year more than 740,000 rural production co-operatives had been reorganized into 
26,000 People’s Communes, with almost all farmers absorbed into this system. The 
system would remain fairly stable until the decade of opening-up policies and reform 
when new forms of co-operative arose under such names as ‘specialized co-
operatives’ and ‘stock-holding co-operatives’ (MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1992; 
Vermeer et al., 1998).  
The relationship between collectivist values and Maoism has been explored in 
scholarship. A study by Ho (1978) shows that Mao Zedong wanted an anti-
individualistic, pro-collectivist spirit to penetrate traditional Chinese culture so that a 
national collectivist culture could be established (Harrison, 2000). For Mao, 
individualism represented absolute evil and individualists were selfish, putting their 
personal interests first. Collectivism, by contrast, was seen to have a purer and higher 
purpose: its adherents place importance on duty and harmony, recognizing that their 
individual interests are subordinate to those of the group to which they belong. 
International studies on individualism, national cultures, and work-related values have 
consistently confirmed the Chinese collectivist nature (Tung, 1988; Hofstede and dan 
Bond, 1988; Hofstede, 2001; Littrell, 2002; Abdou and Kliche 2004).  
The second research question can be answered as following. Mao used the co-
operative model ideologically in a bid partially to disguise his plans of forced 
collectivization and propaganda. During his long rule of China, collectivized work 
and production were confused with the notion of the co-operative firm that had 
appeared in China long before Mao gained power. While some types of co-operatives, 
such as the Rural Co-operative Medical Scheme, peaked under Maoism, when it 
comes to quality and adherence to the original model, this period was not a 
remarkable moment for the Chinese co-operative movement. 
The contribution of this section is a clear statement about the ambiguous 
relationship between Mao and the Chinese co-operative movement. Maoism 
represented a deviation from original co-operative ideals and practices as imported to 
China by foreigners and western-educated Chinese people who, together, developed a 
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local co-operative movement. That long experience is now very distant and neglected 
by contemporary political elites. Consequently, the Chinese co-operative movement 
could develop a better and freer relationship with the political authorities, though we 
will argue in section 6 that a civil society (Fulda et al., 2012) is a requirement for the 
flourishing of such a genuine co-operative movement.  
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4 A LONG INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION 
Mapping the transformation of the forms of collective work, we will answer 
the third research question: how has the co-operative model evolved alongside 
political and institutional transition?  
Over the years very different organizational forms and structures have been 
given the label co-operative or collective (see Table 1). The dramatic institutional 
transition that transformed the nation at the founding of the Republic and later of the 
People’s Republic, through Maoism, the Cultural Revolution, the opening-up policies, 
to the most contemporary reforms, has entirely altered the legal framework and the 
very notion of the co-operative in China (MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1987, 1992). 
Table 1 summarizes the main forms of collective work that through time, in 
different ways, have been juxtaposed, rightly or wrongly, with the notion of the co-
operative in China. Maoist variants are examples of deviation from western 
principles. In general, over time, efficiency, responsibility and incentives that were 
originally individual became collective. The average dimension of the collective grew 
and voluntary membership disappeared. The most recent forms represent a return to 
the original characteristics: small scale, individual participation, and incentives 
(Keating, 1994; Keating 1997; Hongyi, 2000; Perotti et.al., 1998; Xiangyu et.al., 
2008). 
--------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------- 
Gung Ho Co-operatives: The co-operatives established in the 1910s and 
1920s, as well as those in the 1930s and 1940s (properly members of the Gung Ho 
Movement), were fully western style co-operatives with voluntary organization, self-
financing, individual responsibility for gains and losses, democratic management, and 
distribution of profits to each member in proportion to their work or their economic 
interaction with the co-operative. 
Mutual Aid Team: Among the various forms of co-operatives, the mutual aid 
team has enjoyed great popularity. In this model, based on voluntary participation, 
four or five households from a neighbourhood put together their agricultural 
equipment and their farm animals. The collaboration went as far as exchanging 
working hours on temporary or long-term agreements, while the land remained the 
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property of individual families. Between 1949 and 1955, the mutual aid team was 
promoted as the principal method of increasing production in the countryside.  
Elementary Co-operative: From 1955 to 1979, co-operatives became a tool of 
the Chinese Government in controlling agricultural production and making it a 
collective effort. The Elementary Co-operative emerged in 1954 and expanded rapidly 
in its early years. A greater number of families participated in the elementary co-
operative compared to the mutual aid team (usually 20 to 30), and members shared 
land in addition to animals and equipment. The co-operative’s profit was distributed 
according to two principles: payment for the contribution of land, animals, and 
equipment made by each member, and a second payment in relation to the amount of 
work done by each member. During this period, the attitude towards the development 
of co-operatives was cautious and peasants were encouraged to participate in different 
types of co-operative organization on a voluntary basis (Chinn, 1980).  
Advanced Co-operative: Among the various forms of co-operatives, the 
Advanced Co-operative emerged around 1955 with a number of distinctive features. 
All means of production including the land were collective property; members 
worked under centralized management, remuneration was based solely on the number 
of hours worked. In 1955, the central Government decided to accelerate the process of 
collectivization. As a result, the principle of voluntary participation was deliberately 
forgotten and peasants were persuaded, if not forced, to participate in the advanced 
co-operative system. The number of advanced co-operatives increased from 500 in 
1955 to 753,000 in 1957, involving around 119 million households. 
People’s Commune: In 1958, a new type of collective work was introduced on 
a vast scale, the so-called People’s Commune, which was to play a decisive role in 
rural areas until 1978. A People’s Commune consisted of about 30 advanced co-
operatives, combining an average of 5,000 households and 10,000 acres of cultivable 
land. Initially, payments in the commune were based in part on subsistence needs and 
partly in relation to work accomplished. Later, in 1962, when production and 
management were delegated to smaller units, with production teams consisting of 
about 20-30 families, the system changed. The production team became the basic unit 
for work and accounting. Under the new system, members of the team received ‘work 
points’ for their performance, and at the end of the year income was distributed to 
individuals on the basis of work points accumulated. The system of collective 
agriculture remained until 1979 (Powell, 1992, Hu et al., 2005). 
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Supply and Marketing Co-operatives: In the collectivized agricultural system, 
the supply of goods required for agriculture, and the processing and marketing of 
products, was centrally planned by the government. Supply and marketing co-
operatives were Government organizations that provided farmers with inputs and 
work materials. Agricultural products were harvested and distributed by the 
Government and farmers did not have the freedom to sell their production in a free 
market (Hendrikse and Veerman, 1997). Until the 1980s, this method was known as 
the Unified Purchasing and Supply System (UPSS, or ‘tonggou-tong-xiao’ in 
Chinese). A study has argued that the majority of Supply and Marketing Co-
operatives were still not effectively controlled by their farmer-members  (Xiangyu et 
al., 2008). 
Technology Association: New forms of co-operatives emerged in the 
transition simply to deal with inefficiencies concerning access to inputs, technology, 
information, and markets by small farmers. In the 1980s, new co-operative 
organizations called ‘Technology Associations’ were formed by farmers to promote 
the use of new technologies, for the supply of farming materials, and to encourage 
commercialization. The ‘Technology Association’ was adopted not only by the 
farmers but also by large processing companies, local authorities in rural areas and by 
the State itself in organising farming supply and commercialization (Deng et al. 
2010). Data up to 2004 bear witness to the success of the new model, with more than 
150,000 active co-operatives (The Rural Development Institute, 2004, p. 157). 
Household Responsibility System: As is well known, China began a political 
and economic transition in 1978 (Naughton, 1996). The central planning of economic 
activities was gradually transformed into a market-oriented system. In the new 
system, with the support of Deng Xiaoping from 1981, agriculture based on collective 
structures was replaced by a system based on the family. A system of family 
responsibility was adopted experimentally in 1978 by farmers in the province of 
An’hui. It gave the peasants temporary control of land ownership and any related 
income. The system was characterized by collective ownership of land, although 
farmers and their families were independent production units. Ownership of the land 
belongs collectively to the villages (Perotti et al., 1998) and these loan it to nuclear 
families based on the number of people and workers in each family. Initially the 
length of the loan ranged from one to three years, eventually being renewed for 15 
years. In 2002, contract renewal was extended to 30 years. The contract specified the 
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family’s obligations to the State for dues, taxes, and related charges. The family had 
the right freely to dispose of anything in excess of these obligations. The system 
introduced incentives for farmers who invested in order to increase productivity. In 
the first six years of the reform, agricultural production increased by 30%. As the 
reform progressed, the UPSS was phased out to make room for a free market in 
agricultural products. By 1982, the Government was starting to encourage farmers to 
sell their products in the markets. In 1985, the UPSS was officially abolished and 
from then on the Government bought wheat and cotton based on negotiated contracts, 
while pork, fish, vegetables, and other products were open to free trade. The transition 
(Hongyi, 2000) brought new challenges for farmers who, instead of producing the 
quantities and types of products required by the state, were obliged to deal with the 
dynamics of market demand.  
New Rural Co-operative Medical Scheme: Chinese co-operatives are not only 
found in the agricultural sector. Since 2002, the national Government has been re-
launching the rural health co-operative scheme, essentially similar to the model of the 
western ‘health mutual insurances’. The Chinese version is also directly involved in 
the management of basic health services and it is connected with the experience of the 
‘barefoot doctors’ (Brown and Theoharides, 2009; Bernardi and Greenwood 2010). 
The central government, aware of the rural-urban divide of opportunities and living 
conditions, has been giving great emphasis to rural health care reform through the 
New Rural Medical Co-operatives (Brown et. al., 2009; Zhao, 2011). 
Specialized Farmer Consortia and Co-operatives: The new co-operatives that 
arose, starting in the 1980s, take two different forms: consortia (or associations) on 
the one hand and pure co-operatives on the other. Specialist agricultural consortia 
represent 65% of the 150,000 organizations in a 2004 census, while specialized 
agricultural co-operatives constitute the other 35% (The Rural Development Institute, 
2004, p. 157). The main difference between the two models lies in the ownership of 
assets and the way they carry out such functions as production, marketing, and 
processing. In general, specialized co-operatives are registered with the Industry and 
Commerce Administration; they have invested capital and resemble western co-
operatives in the functions they perform. The specialized agricultural associations, 
however, are registered with the Office of Civil Affairs, have no capital invested, do 
not require the payment of a social contribution, and are primarily concerned with 
providing technical assistance and training. The Farmer Professional Co-operatives 
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Law, 2006, proclaims in one of its first articles principles perfectly in line with those 
of the international co-operative movement:  
“The farmer co-operative shall comply with the following 
principles: (a) farmers play the dominant role among its members; 
(b) the key purpose is to serve members and act in the common 
interests of all members; (c) the members shall join and exit 
voluntarily; (d) all members are equal and Co-operatives are 
democratically controlled; (e) surplus should be redistributed based 
on the volume of members’ patronage.” 
The deployment of this law has been somehow controversial. It raised high 
expectations for its emphasis on bottom-up economic initiative and participation and 
because of the possibility for farmers’ co-operatives to diversify with a plurality of 
businesses such as farming, energy production, or recreation. Unfortunately, higher-
level co-operatives are allowed to join the capital and to use voting rights to up the 
20%. This has proved to be problematic in many cases. A small group of farmers can 
hardly handle the power imbalance between them and the huge organisations now 
authorized to take active initiative in the life of the co-operative. Additionally, there is 
a conflict of interests between the individual members and the corporate members 
who trade services and goods with the specialised farmers’ co-operatives. 
Notwithstanding the experience of township villages (Hongyi, 2000), cases of 
industrial co-operatives are rare. There are, however, numerous co-operative banks 
(Wang, 2005). Yet after the many scandals of the past decade, the sector has 
undergone a drastic restructuring that has included the bailout performed by the 
National Bank of Agriculture (Lynette, 2009; Yuk-Shing, 2006).  
The adoption of the co-operative model for emerging problems is an on-going 
process. For instance, a very recent case is connected to the rising pressure from 
urbanization policies and the growth of conflicts at village level. The Government has 
incentivized the creation of village co-operatives in charge of controlling the 
collective land, deciding about its use, and sharing the revenues of infrastructures or 
real estate developments, if agreed in the community (OECD, 2013).  
As Figure 1 shows, over the last ten years collective forms of business 
ownership have been declining in importance, whereas private enterprises have 
increased substantially. The size and role of the State is also being readjusted 
dramatically though a strong hold remains on regulation, planning, and ownership of 
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strategic corporations. Unfortunately, the OECD and the national statistics data do not 
identify specific forms of co-operative, but we assume these to be mostly part of the 
‘collective’ area. 
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At this point it is difficult to see what proportion of these are private co-
operatives and which are local collective enterprises controlled by local Government 
or by the citizens. It would be even more difficult to establish the proportion of the 
co-operatives in which the enterprises are genuinely owned and controlled by workers 
or users, rather than being nominal co-operatives under the control of the local-
authority managers who in one way or another have assumed leadership. It can be 
argued that the Chinese transition from socialism to market economy has been much 
more effective than the Russian one and that this can be partly attributed to the role 
played by those forms of collective organization of production and ownership. The 
collective acted as a buffer between State and Market during the transition and 
development of new institutions. 
We can now address our third research question, namely ‘How has the Co-
operative model evolved together with the political and institutional transition’? The 
Chinese co-operative movement has undergone considerable alteration through its 
history, during which quite a few models and institutional forms have been developed, 
transformed, or abandoned. This process of transformation was provoked by 
significant political, ideological, socio-economic, and institutional changes (Stettner, 
1984, 1987).  
Through time, responsibility and incentives that were previously collective 
became individual, raising participation, real co-operation and productivity. Workers 
were progressively given freedom to take individual responsibilities. We are not sure, 
though, that Chinese society, as it stands, permits a full membership and active 
participation, which might require the civil society to have developed (Hall, 1995; 
Fulda et al., 2012). In developing social entrepreneurship (Galera and Borzaga, 2009) 
without active citizenship (Van de Ven et al., 2007; Short el al., 2009), the risk here is 
that the outcome might be a hybrid organisation with traditional managers and silent 
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membership unwilling or incapable of exercising its rights in the assemblies. This is 
as well, sometimes, the case in Europe or in the Americas (Bernardi and Köppä, 
2011), where traditional entrepreneurship takes place in the guise of co-operative 
firms serving the interests of the few, while true social entrepreneurship should serve 
the community or a range of active stakeholders. In the implications section, we will 
argue that civil society is a requirement for the development of true social 
entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, the Gung Ho approach is alive again, at least as an 
ambition if not yet as a widespread practice. Had it been successful in the 1930s and 
1940s, the Gung Ho might have contributed to a very different evolutionary path 
focused on democratic membership, industrial development in rural areas, and 
bottom-up economic initiative rather than top-down organization of production. 
The main contribution of this section is the description of the cycle which co-
operatives have undergone: from small-scale co-operation, individual responsibility, 
and incentives to collectivization. After Mao, transition moved again back to 
individual incentives, small-scale voluntary co-operation and responsibility. It may be 
that the Gung Ho principles are coming back. The organization itself was allowed to 
reopen in 1987 and is still active today, despite being much smaller than the other co-
operative associations in China that claim to represent up to 160 million members, 
such as the All China Federation of Marketing and Supply Co-operatives (Xiangyu et 
al., 2008). 
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5 THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA  
 In this section, we claim that there are two main challenges threatening the 
sustainable development of contemporary China. Answering our fourth research 
question, we argue that the co-operative movement can contribute to this. 
The first challenge is the transition from State to private ownership and the 
consolidation of a non-capitalist market economy model. In the literature on the 
Chinese economic system (Nathan, 1997; Arrighi, 2007; Tsai, 2007; Naughton, 1996, 
2007), a common focus is so-called capitalism without democracy on the one hand, 
and the market without capitalism on the other. By its nature, the co-operative 
enterprise form is liable to remain excluded from such a dialectical model. One key 
element of co-operative diversity (Bernardi, 2007) is the ownership right system, a 
non-capitalist one:  
‘the freedom of enterprise is a fundamental characteristic of the 
most advanced modern economies. Capitalism, on the contrary, is 
contingent; it is simply the particular form of ownership that most 
often, but certainly not always, proves most efficient with the given 
technology’ (Hansmann, 1996).  
Arrighi (2007), in his compelling book Adam Smith in Beijing, challenges the 
neo-liberal interpretation of the economic success of China. On the contrary, in 
anticipation of a conflict between western and Asian models, he proposes a 
reinterpretation of Smith and Marx. In particular, according to Arrighi, in China today 
there are firm signs of a type of non-capitalist market economy described by Smith in 
his Wealth of Nations. At that time Adam Smith was aware of the leading role of 
China, but was not able to predict how the industrial revolution would enable the 
great leap forward of the western nations. Only thirty years ago, the Chinese economy 
was almost entirely controlled by the various levels of government. At the peak of 
their development, State businesses were responsible for the vast majority of 
industrial production and they employed the majority of the non-agricultural 
workforce. Collective enterprises accounted for the rest, with no other type of 
business allowed. Since the authorization of private enterprises in 1979, the 
proportion of production resulting from enterprises, whether State or collective has 
continued to decrease exponentially. The international literature in recent years on 
China’s transition is very rich. However, the analyses focus on the dialectic of State 
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versus Private and, if anything, allude to the ‘collective’ sector; reference to co-
operatives is conspicuously absent.  
The second challenge is the sustainability of growth. The economic policies of 
the last two decades have favoured economic growth and the nation’s modernization. 
Every year millions of Chinese have crossed the threshold out of poverty and the 
prospects of wellbeing and living conditions have improved sharply between 
generations and within the same generation. However, social problems and the growth 
of inequality have begun to alarm the Chinese Communist Party. A useful tool to 
measure successes and failures of contemporary Chinese policies is the Human 
Development index (HDI) inspired by Amartya Sen, and developed by Fukuda-Parr 
and Kumar in 2003. The HDI is an attempt to take account of other factors, not just 
the usual GDP, which determine the well-being of individuals and the development of 
a nation: longevity (as measured by life expectancy at birth), educational level 
(measured by the literacy rate of adults), GDP per capita expressed through 
purchasing-power parity. This index ranges from 0 to 1. An HDI level below 0.5 
represents low development, and according to the 2013 report, there are about 30 
countries in this band, all located in Africa bar four Asian nations. A level above 0.8 
HDI is highly developed and in this band, comprising 70 countries, we find all the 
developed countries of North America, Western Europe, Oceania, East Asia, and 
some developing countries. Figures 2 and 3 show success measured by the Human 
Development Index at national level, comparing China’s performance with the world-
average trend and with other nations’ trends.  
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An HDI of between 0.5 and 0.8 represents the medium development, and in 
this group we find all countries with intermediate development and developing 
countries, including India and China (Rowley, 2012). In the case of India, 
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performance in terms of HDI is much higher than that measured by GDP per capita. 
The Chinese HD scores are encouraging, particularly when compared with those of 
other developing nations (see Figures 2 and 3). Yet China is a country of great 
contradictions and striking regional disparities (Clegg, 2006). Figure 4 presents an 
indicator of Human Development at provincial level. Even within these same (and 
vast) provinces there are large differences, primarily between rural and urban areas. 
Particularly noteworthy are the distinctions between the north-western interior of 
Mainland China and its southern and eastern coastal regions.  
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Given those two sustainability challenges, human development and smooth 
economic transition, can the Co-operative movement contribute to the needs of 
contemporary China?  
With regards to the economic transition from State to private market, the 
collective and co-operative sector made possible in China what did not happen in 
Russia. Several buffer institutions (Table 1) have assisted collective organization of 
production and collective ownership during the slow transition away from State 
ownership and State planning. If the institutional evolution of the co-operative sector 
and the relevant legislation moves towards democratic participation and bottom-up 
entrepreneurial initiatives, this process will provide considerable support to Chinese 
transition more broadly and will help with sustainability. The co-operative sector and 
the third sector could contribute in the case of market failures (Salamon, 2010; 
Stiglitz, 2009). Moreover, the co-operative sector worldwide has proved notably 
resilient, especially during periods of crisis, whether in the past or in more recent 
times (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009; Michie and Llewellyn, 2010; Stiglitz, 2009). 
The growth of the Chinese economy is continuous, showing great intelligence 
in economic policy as well as in international strategy (Zou D., 1994). However, 
despite significant progress in the indexes of well-being and of absolute poverty, there 
is an evident and growing inequality of income. There is growth, there is a market 
economy, and there is a modern and very ambitious financial market. But despite 
claiming to be socialist (Zhang, 2009), the Chinese nation lacks many of the 
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institutions of social protection. China cannot continue to prosper for very much 
longer without proper health-care insurance and social security (Florence and 
Defraigne, 2013). This vision of a harmonious and cohesive society cannot be realized 
without decent public health-care throughout the country, without a universal social-
security system, without the protection of labour, without the enforcement of decent 
minimum wages, without occupational health and safety policies, or labour rights 
(Cooney et al., 2013; Pringle, 2011). Co-operatives may provide an answer to many 
of those issues (ILO, 2002; United Nations, 2013). Key priorities are the fight against 
pollution and the contamination of natural resources, as well as the sustainability of 
urbanization and rural poverty. The period which was marked by an emphasis on 
growth at all costs has ended. The policy objectives for the latest five-year plans have 
put great emphasis, instead, on social security and the sustainability of development. 
As far as growth and human development are concerned, the co-operative 
sector has longstanding worldwide experience of providing solutions. Farmers co-
operatives and consumers co-operatives have served the cause of food security and 
responsible supplies. The co-operative credit model was born to serve the working 
class and has proved reliable and resilient during times of crisis for centuries; it could 
also be a very good alternative to the shadow banking system which is ubiquitous in 
China (Lynette Ong, 2009). The New Rural Co-operative Medical Scheme is working 
well and it may become more efficient and effective still with the arrival of 
competitors of a similar nature. The recent co-operative legislation also supports co-
operatives that are willing to diversify to sustainable energy production, through 
micro hydro or biomass stations. Finally, the promotion of workers’ co-operatives is 
recommended by the International Labour Office (2002) for the diffusion of decent 
work practices in developed and developing countries. 
Modern co-operation (in production, banking, retail, and housing) was born in 
Europe shortly after the industrial revolution, in an economic context of rapid change 
and serious social problems (urbanization, pollution, exploitation of labour, little 
social or union protection, poverty, inequality). This scenario in part describes 
China’s boom of the last 20 years. But the more advanced forms of western co-
operative enterprise (MacPherson, 2008), such as the social co-operative, the green 
energy co-operatives, and the peer-to-peer banking co-operative, would also fit well 
with China’s contemporary needs (Florence and Defraigne, 2013). Both traditional 
and new models of co-operation have the potential to improve the living and working 
28 
 
conditions of Chinese people (Cooney et al., 2013). The Chinese Government and 
Legislature have recently (in the 12th Five Years Plan and in the 2013 meetings of the 
National People's Congress) defined such challenges and, in some cases, have 
explicitly mentioned the co-operative firm as a tool which has the capacity to address 
them.  
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6 IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, implications for theory, for practice and for policy are 
presented. They are connected with our four research questions but are also 
interconnected. These will be followed by short comments on the limitations of this 
study and on the need for future research. 
The main implication for theory is that it is essential in studying co-operation 
in China to use the construct of civil society. Studies on co-operation and civil society 
are now rather common in the scientific literature of most western countries. In the 
case of China, those studies are lacking, despite the fact that they would be 
indispensable, we argue. A theoretical advance in the knowledge and understanding 
of the Co-operative and mutuals phenomena in China must be coupled with the issue 
of members’ participation and bottom-up social entrepreneurship. Therefore, we 
argue, scholarship must consider and use the theoretical construct of civil society. We 
have argued that the new Chinese economic environment seems favourable to the co-
operative enterprise. While this remains marginal compared to both State and private 
companies, there is room for co-operative initiatives. However, an active co-operative 
economy requires an active civil society (Fulda et al., 2012), and this is still an under-
developed concept in China. According to Hall (1995), the idea of civil society 
includes all those formal and informal organizations that act as a bridge between 
Government and business, such as charities, voluntary organizations, political parties, 
and so on. In these spaces, people can self-organize and take responsibility for their 
problems, sometimes superseding Government intervention. Given this premise, it is 
not surprising that in contemporary China a strong civil society does not exist (Fulda 
et al., 2012), since it would quite clearly pose a threat to governmental power. At the 
beginning of its history, the Chinese Co-operative movement complied with this 
requirement, as the Gung Ho experience flourished because it had its roots in 
participation, sustainability and democracy (Cook and Clegg 2012). Today this is not 
at all widely the case. For those reasons, the scholarly research on Chinese mutuals 
and cooperatives must investigate the presence of democracy and autonomy at 
organisational level and of civil society as a trigger and catalyst of true social 
entrepreneurship initiatives. 
The main implication for practice is that the interactions between Chinese and 
international cooperative movements need to be established on the basis of a sincere 
agreement of common values. The International Co-operative Alliance needs to make 
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sure that its Chinese members are not agencies of the Government but rather 
associations or federations of true co-operatives. It is now too late to hope for the 
growth of the Gung Ho, only a minor organisation compared to the giant federations, 
which are deeply involved with government bodies and supposedly represent millions 
of members and hundreds of thousands of Chinese co-operatives, such as in the case 
of the All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Co-operatives. Nevertheless, 
ICA can still support the heritage of the Gung Ho and state that its values and 
principles are the same as the international co-operative movement and ICA itself. 
Clarity on the nature of Chinese co-operatives and their second and third level 
organisations would make it easier for Chinese members of the ICA to participate 
actively, but would also improve the likelihood of business collaboration between 
western and Chinese co-operatives.  
The implications for policy are connected with what we have argued about 
theory and practice. This study has explained how the co-operative business model 
may contribute to sustainability: providing opportunities for Human Development and 
smoothing the transition of the economic system from State planning and ownership 
towards market and private ownership. If moving beyond market fundamentalism to a 
more balanced economy is a worldwide necessity (Stiglitz, 2009), this all the more 
true for China, and co-operatives can contribute to this. But this contribution is 
provided only by true co-operatives; because, for instance, a fake co-operative is not 
necessarily more environmentally sustainable than a capitalist firm, or a fake co-
operative bank is not necessarily reliable. Furthermore, a fake co-operative would not 
help to empower farmers and villagers and would not protect them in the interactions 
with much bigger organisations (see the case of the Farmers’ Specialised Co-
operatives). For that reason, the Chinese Government has to facilitate the emergence 
of a true co-operative model, and, as we have argued, a civil society is needed to 
support the flourishing of participation in true co-operatives. NGOs, Associations, and 
other civil-society organisations are today again on the increase in China (see Table 
2), yet this is without the concerted support of the Government and it is happening 
very slowly when compared to usual Chinese trends.  
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Indeed, such organizations must have formal authorization to operate, so that 
any undesirable organization has no chance of success. The central Government’s 
attitude towards associations remains cautious; support is granted only to those kinds 
of associations that are entirely economic in nature, and will not become even slightly 
involved in political issues. Even when it comes to economic issues a true civil-
society organization might pose a risk for the political establishment because 
collective organizations might express interests in conflict with those supported by 
local or national authorities:  
“Non-governmental organization (NGO) can contribute to urban 
management in a number of ways, serving as a channel for 
participation, and playing important roles in aiding vulnerable 
people, increasing social tolerance and safeguarding social 
stability. They help reduce the misuse of market mechanisms and 
government interventions. Legislation to encourage NGO 
participation lags behind, however, even as the number of these 
groups is increasing rapidly” (UNDP, 2013, p. 42).  
Civil society could also play also a role as a watchdog of the policy makers 
and the private firms when sustainability and fairness is at stake (Gao and Chi, 1996; 
Fulda et al., 2012). There are opportunities for the Chinese Co-operative sector but it 
must converge with the western model, or better, go back to its origins, when, 
between 1912 and 1949, Chinese intellectuals and practitioners developed an 
autochthone Chinese co-operative model incorporating foreign experiences. If the 
Chinese authorities are truly concerned with the sustainability of their growth model, 
and if they are genuinely interested in the co-operative sector as one of the possible 
answers to this, they must aim for the development of a true Co-operative movement 
and not of a hybrid characterized by strong ties with Government bodies and lack of 
democracy and bottom-up entrepreneurship.  
There are two limitations to this study. We had to rely on oral and written 
translation of the Chinese Mandarin language. This does not necessarily compromise 
the results of such a study, but must nonetheless be taken into account. Furthermore, 
we started the research taking for granted the validity of the assumptions of the 
collectivist nature of Chinese culture. We had to consequently challenge those 
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assumptions, which nevertheless, with some precaution, remain an interesting device 
for management research, teaching and practice (Hofstede, 2002). 
Further research is needed. First of all, the evolution of Chinese culture and 
business practices needs to be monitored as the exchanges between Asia and the 
western world grows (Warner 2013; Nankervis et al., 2013). The evolution of the 
Chinese co-operative legislation and relevant national and local Government policies 
needs to be observed further. Finally, the interactions between the International Co-
operative Alliance, its western members and its Chinese components require 
investigation. We don’t know yet whether and how an institutional process of mutual 
influence is taking place, nor else in which direction any such influence is working, 
i.e., if China is influencing the ICA or rather the International Co-operative Alliance 
is shaping the Chinese Co-operative sector.  
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7  CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we have shown that the western notion of the co-operative fits 
well with the Chinese case and that we are in fact dealing with the same phenomenon, 
one which has a long history. We have described how Maoism has represented a 
deviation to the evolutionary path of the Chinese co-operative movement that 
otherwise, earlier and after that experience, has been converging to the western model. 
Its original development itself was indeed shaped by western direct influence. We 
have told the story of how the co-operative model has evolved hand in hand with 
political and institutional transition. We have finally argued that in contemporary 
China the co-operative movement has the potential to make really quite dramatic 
contributions to the sustainable and prosperous development of China. The memory 
of forced collectivization and limits placed on the growth of a proper civil society are 
far from helpful to the revival of co-operation in China. However, despite a very 
heavy historical legacy and some contemporary institutional constraints, a bright 
future is not only desirable but possible for the Chinese co-operative movement. 
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TABLES AND CHARTS 
 
Institution Sector Period Characteristics 
Gung Ho Co-operatives Manufacture 1938-49 Small scale, voluntary membership, 
individual investment in the equity and 
individual incentives. 
Mutual Aid Team Agriculture 1949-55 Up to 5 families, voluntary membership, 
individual ownership of land. 
Elementary Co-operative Agriculture 1955-79 Up to 30families, voluntary membership 
at the beginning. 
Advanced Co-operative Agriculture 1955 No individual ownership of means of 
production, no voluntary membership. 
People's Commune Agriculture 1958-78 Up to 5000 households originally, than 
30 families, no voluntary. 
Supply and Marketing Co-
operatives 
Agriculture 
and 
distribution 
From 
1954, 
reformed 
in 1982 
No voluntary membership until reform. 
15 and then 30 years lease of land to 
farmers, individual responsibility on 
productivity and revenues. 
Technology Association Agroindustry 
and 
distribution 
From 
1980s 
Focused on technological improvements 
Household Responsibility 
System 
Agriculture From 1981 Voluntary membership. Individual 
responsibility and rewards. 
New Rural Co-operative 
Medical Scheme 
Health-care From 2002 Voluntary membership. 
Specialized Farmer 
Consortia and Co-operatives 
Agroindustry From 2007 Individual lease of the land for a medium 
to long period. Small and multi business. 
Table 1, Evolution of main co-operative business forms. 
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Figure 1, Relative economic weight by ownership type, number of firms and 
employment (OECD, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, Human Development Index of China and the world, 1990-2012 (UNDP, 
2013). 
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Figure 3, Human Development Index and its main components for China and other 
countries. Source: UNDP 2014.  
 
 
Figure 4, Human Development Index by province (UNDP, 2010). 
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Year Mass organisations 
(10.000) 
Private non-enterprise 
organizations (10.000) 
Foundations 
2001 12.9 8.2 - 
2002 13.3 11.1 - 
2003 14.2 12.4 954 
2004 15.3 13.5 892 
2005 17.1 14.8 975 
2006 19.2 16.1 1144 
2007 21.2 17.4 1340 
2008 23.0 18.2 1597 
2009 23.5 18.8 1780 
2010 24.3 19.5 2168 
2011 25.3 20.2 2510 
 
Table 2, Growing number of NGOs. Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs and UNDP 
(2013). 
